

Neg[oti]ations: Learning from Three Frankfurt Schools.

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In a posthumous book, written in exile by Siegfried Kracauer, perhaps the greatest writer of the old *Frankfurter Zeitung*, we find: “The ancient historians used to preface their histories by a short autobiographical statement – as if they wanted immediately to inform the reader of their location in time and society, that Archimedean point from which they would subsequently set out to roam the past.”¹ I am of course tempted to use this as an apology for the exercise to come, especially since Kracauer was a correspondent of both Mannheim and Horkheimer, and a disciple of neither, but I move forward also under the caution light ignited by Robert D. Cumming, who brilliantly used John Stuart Mill’s oddly falsified “Autobiography” as a cautionary lesson for the deceptions of “intellectual history,” notably its use as cover-up for unresolved philosophical problems.² Accordingly, I offer the following less in the spirit of an ancient historian than in that of a perpetual and perennially hopeful student.

My one-word title is an indirect confession that I have not been a very faithful graduate of the best known of the “Frankfurt Schools,” since it plays off the English title of one of Herbert Marcuse’s most brilliant essay collections, “Negations,” and points in a direction that almost all members of the Horkheimer group excoriated. Their angrily pursued target as unprincipled compromiser was Karl Mannheim, who shared the building of the *Institut für Sozialforschung*

¹ Kracauer, *History. The Last Things Before the Last* (1961). I am indebted for the quotation and for much of the impetus to self-reflection to my friend and correspondent, Jerry Zaslove, to whom the work is dedicated.

² Robert Denoon Cumming, *Human Nature and History* (1969). Cp. David Kettler “Robert Denoon Cumming, 1916-2004.” *Political Theory*, 33.2 (April, 2005) 154-157.

between 1930 and 1933, and who has been the subject of much of my scholarship. More remote for all but one or two of the group was the workshop of Hugo Sinzheimer, the prime theorist of the collective-bargaining-centered Weimar labor law, based in the *Akademie der Arbeit*, and whose work had a special fascination for me during the 1980s and 1990s. At the risk of laboring the wordplay, let me say that the concept of negotiations that I adapted over the years from the other two Frankfurt-based “schools” is as far as I have ever been able to go with a negation of negations. I shall try to persuade you that my course has been something more and better than impressionable eclecticism, although it cannot be denied that I share these multiple connections with my teacher, Franz L. Neumann. I begin with “my road to Frankfurt” and continue with my maneuverings around the Frankfurter Kreuz, where I am still not rarely nailed down *im Stau*.

But it all starts in Leipzig, where I was born on 1. July 1930. My father came to Germany from Kherson in 1908, at age 3, and my mother, from Brody in 1914, at age 12. Posthumously they are both from Ukrainia. They were Ostjuden, in short, without more than primary education, but they were also acculturated to the world of standing room at the opera. My mother’s parents were sheltered by orthodoxy, but her brothers were worldly and reasonably successful business men. She met my father at the Bar Kochba sports club, which she had fought to attend, and she overcame family opposition to marry the slightly younger, impecunious son of a thoroughly secularized and Russified household. Until the Aryan takeover of the stores, my father worked as an ill-paid stock clerk in my uncles’ business; but my parents sought to cultivate my brother and me to middle-class German-Jewish standards. Until it was forced shut on November 10, 1938, my slightly older brother and I attended the Höhere Jüdische Schule, conducted by a husband and wife belonging to the famous rabbinical Carlebach family.

According to my cousin Heinz, midway in age between my father and me and a survivor of seven years in concentration camps, my father was leftist in his politics and read avidly about the Soviet Union. I cannot say, of my own knowledge, since he died on April 30, 1940, four weeks after our arrival in the United States, when he had just turned 35 and when I was just approaching my 10th birthday.

For the first four years in the United States, my mother worked in a factory and we were dependent on distant relations for occasional outings in middle class America. Although my mother was part of a small group of German-speaking refugees given employment by the proprietor of the Maidenform Brassier Company, we stopped speaking German at home almost immediately; and there were no German-speakers and few Jews in the largely working-class school I attended. Eventually, my mother married a widowed shopkeeper, an uneducated Russian-Jewish emigrant--an arrangement in which housekeeping and related services were exchanged for a somewhat more secure standard of living—"for the sake of the children." My adolescence was a fairly lonely struggle, but I managed to come out of high school without an education but with qualifications good enough to gain admission to Columbia College. And with sufficient savings from my summer employments to pay tuition for the first semester. I was remarkable at the end of high school only in having an exceptional vocabulary, I recall, as a result of reading popular lending library books at the rate of five a week, including class time, where I infuriated my teachers by always having a novel propped up on my desk. Although I had somewhere picked up a mildly leftish political inclination, which offended my patriotic teachers, and had read some Freud with my two friends, in order to belittle other acquaintances by our

unsolicited insights into their dreams and slips of the tongue, it is safe to say that everything I encountered in college was new. I was an eager, grateful student.

Columbia College at the time did not even require students to select a major field, as long as we accumulated credits in advanced courses, so I balanced classes in philosophy, economics, political science, and history. My honors thesis, however, was on Marx's *German Ideology*. I could not say much about it, since I wanted to believe it all, but had misgivings. By then, I was nevertheless one of six members of the moribund campus front organization, Young Progressives of America, where the other five, constituting the Communist Party cell, used to caucus beforehand, in order to work out the party line for the meeting, where I would join their number. We demonstrated against the Korean War, as I recall, as well as against the awarding of an honorary degree to a Rightist dictator. Our primary contribution was a series on Negro History, which was a subject hardly noticed then except in some segments of the ethnic community and along the Communist front. It was my conviction that my involvement with Communists was strictly a tactical maneuver, that I was using them to promote my own causes, and that this opportunistic affiliation did not oblige me to believe most of what they claimed, especially about the Soviet Union and its allies. Still, my cooperation with them also inclined me to discount or undervalue reports of abuses so harsh as to upset my compact.

As an undergraduate, my academic culture was quite passive,. I was a "good student," who was prepared to play the various games designed by my professors, albeit with some hope that these would also help me to advance my political project. My typical grade was an A-minus, indicating that I had done the job without breaking any new ground. After a course on

the history of political thought, taught by a shy, young Canadian, who followed Franz Neumann's syllabus, I knew that I would somehow pursue this study, but I had no idea how that might happen, since I had no conception of academic careers. Some liberal professors with a pragmatist cast of mind imbued me with the sort of anti-dogmatic skepticism that led me, for example, to prefer Karl Mannheim's theory of ideology to that of Nikolai Bukharin. Mostly, I studied diligently what I was assigned. It should be said that I had little time to be intellectually adventurous, since on weekdays I spent over eight hours at work, helping to administer (and eventually to teach in) a proprietary adult high school, designed mostly for veterans of the Second World War and Korean Conflict. An obvious result of this routine was that I had some self-confidence but no immersion in student culture.

My transition into graduate school at Columbia happened as if by itself. My job in the evening high school was secure; there was never any doubt of my being admitted to graduate studies; and a fellowship was found to cover my tuition. It was just as natural that I would now become a student of Franz L. Neumann, although I had never seen him until I entered his large lecture course on "Democracy and Dictatorship" in my last undergraduate summer. The other course that summer, unless I am mistaken, was with Karl Polanyi. Now I was more comfortable as some sort of Marxist, having been introduced to Georg Lukács in a class that also examined Karl Mannheim and Karl Popper. Put somewhat paradoxically, I had found a home in the antifascist emigration, becoming in my habitus an "untimely" member of a generation whose actual members were fifteen to thirty years older. Even my political self-identification was with a "popular front" that had ceased to exist even as a hope at some time around the Stalin-Hitler

Pact. Especially at the emotional level, my emancipation from this morally contradictory *Unzeitmäßigkeit* has been gradual and uneven.

In addition to my classes and seminars with Neumann, as well as courses with Robert K. Merton and Seymour Martin Lipset, great names of the American sociology of the time, I heard Herbert Marcuse for a year in a course significantly called “the” theory of social change (in contrast to a course in the same department called theories of social change). My Master’s essay on “Plato and the Problem of Social Change,” a critique of Popper’s “Open Society,” originated as a paper for Neumann’s seminar but derived its problem formulation from Marcuse’s course. It was my second choice of a topic, selected after a noted specialist in American political studies, anxious about my vulnerability to McCarthyite blacklisting, persuaded me not to undertake a study of “political crime” as an implicit category of American law. Oddly, the advice to pay attention to Plato rather than to politically provocative themes was repeated in 1970, when a department chair sought to help me overcome a political blacklisting at his institution. But that is a different, not very interesting story, with a happy ending in Canada.

In the event, both Neumann and Marcuse read and approved the Master’s essay.. The thesis was that far from being afflicted with “historicism” in Popper’s sense Plato lacked any theory of social or political transformation. The confrontation with Popper was continued in my doctoral dissertation, which began as a grandiose critique of historical theories from Plato to Marx and ended as a narrow study of Adam Ferguson, who was to have been the subject of only a chapter. I continued to look for ways of understanding the uses of history in the construction of social theory, as non-dogmatic Marxists did, without succumbing to the logical errors whose

diagnoses I conceded to Popper. Neither Neumann nor Marcuse directed students' attention to the philosophical writings of Horkheimer or Adorno. We were introduced to the political and historical writings of Hegel and Marx in Neumann's seminar, but, in line with the treatments of other political theorists, we were not asked to reflect on the philosophical structures of their claims. They were indiscriminately labeled theories or ideologies, to be assessed for their respective contributions to the expansion of human freedom. My work on Ferguson consequently sought a strategy for bypassing philosophical issues in the technical sense and ended up—five years later and long after Neumann's early death and Marcuse's departure for Brandeis-- in a conception of eighteenth-century "moral philosophy" as a tension-ridden paradigmatic mode of orientation for modern intellectuals, a study unexpectedly indebted more to Karl Mannheim than to the "critical theory" of the Horkheimer-Adorno "Frankfurt School." Notwithstanding the work's eccentric sociological approach and thesis, which were evidently little remarked except by some skeptical but kind members of the doctoral committee, the book remains one of the standards in the admittedly small field and it has been recently republished.³

In 1960, when the dissertation was approved, I had been a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University for five years. I owed the appointment to a surprising upsurge of interest in political theory initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation in the early 1950s and to the openness to this initiative of a worldly political scientist, recently returned to the university from wartime service in Washington and newly appointed not only as chairman of Ohio State's ambitious program but also as editor of the profession's principal journal. He indulged the slow maturation of my dissertation project in part because he quickly

³ The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1965; republished (with a new introduction and afterword) as Adam Ferguson: His Social and Political Thought. New Brunswick: Transaction, 2005.

employed me as his assistant in editing the *American Political Science Review*, a position that I held for five years and that required me to prepare a summary and preliminary assessment of nearly ten manuscripts a week, a sustained and thorough education in the discipline of political science, which I had largely neglected during my postgraduate studies. Except for some book reviews, I published nothing during these apprenticeship years, preoccupied as well with learning the teaching trade, although one of the reviews was the first of many attempts to come to grips with Neumann, a critique of the posthumous collection of his American essays in which I repeated some criticisms I had made to his face after he asked me to referee his newly prepared article on freedom in the Spring of 1953, when I was an auditor in his doctoral seminar. The key question was how his requirement of a “rational” policy could be met without violating his standards of participatory and liberal freedoms, if the crisis of culture and society was as severe as his diagnosis suggested.⁴ He never liked the question, perhaps because he considered it to hide a Stalinist rationalization. On the facing page in *Dissent*, where my published review appeared, was an appreciation of Neumann by Otto Kirchheimer, whose clues to a subtler reading I learned to appreciate only many years later. In any case, I spent many years attempting to render my critical question less crude...and perhaps better answerable.

Not quite coincidentally, 1960 was also the year I first met Max Horkheimer. Kurt H. Wolff, who had brought him to Ohio State, helped me to secure him as a guest lecturer in my class: he surprised me by speaking with Schopenhauer against Nietzsche. We talked later about my coming to Frankfurt for a year, to follow up my Ferguson study with the study of Marx, to

⁴ “Dilemmas of Radicalism. Review of Franz L. Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1957) *Dissent*, Autumn 1957. 386-392

which it had always been meant to be an introduction. Yet by the time I finished writing my applications for a post-doctoral grant to both the Social Science Research Council and the Fulbright Commission—with success in both cases—I realized that I had first to work through the implications of my practical preference for Karl Mannheim’s approaches. As a result, however, my year of research in the Institute of Social Research in 1961-2 proved to be a largely fictitious affiliation. Neither Adorno nor Horkheimer were at all disposed to encourage my studies of Mannheim, for reasons I barely grasped at the time; and I was too arrogant to recast myself as mere student. With my newfound partner, who became my wife in the course of the year, I lived in Königstein, which was not yet a suburb, and I came to Frankfurt only to acquire a new supply of library books once in a while. My notes of my sole interview with Adorno show that he’d referred me to an advanced student named Jürgen Habermas, but I was too discouraged by Adorno’s manifest contempt for my subject to follow any of his leads. Horkheimer reproached me, when I sought him out at the end of my stay, because I had not requested permission to attend the Institute seminar. On balance, my failure to do so in the absence of an invitation was probably a good thing: I would take my Frankfurt School in small, digestible doses—a metaphor that also comes to mind because my nervous system responded to my first return to Germany with no end of abdominal discomfort, one of my few topics in common with Horkheimer. My Fulbright award brought me to Berlin, with the other grantees, for an orientation by Willy Brandt, among others, in the first Spring of the Wall, and my inability to secure a visa by other means led me to Leipzig for the *Frühlingsmesse*, in defiance of the boycott. I saw Willy Brandt another time, when I attended the SPD Parteitag in Köln as “fraternal delegate” from the tiny and insignificant American Socialist Party, whose Columbus local I chaired. At dinner, a Norwegian delegate told me that he remembered Karl Schiller, who

was sitting at our table, when he taught international trade while wearing his NSDAP *Parteiabzeichen*; and I later joined the delegate from Malta in refusing to stand for “*Deutschland Über Alles*,” even in its pacified version. In my files somewhere, I have a letter to a colleague, in which I report on an unillusioned visit to East Berlin and the Theater am Schiffbauerdamm, among other things, and prescribe an implausible scheme of converting Berlin into a neutral, open city, a free port for trade between East and West. The three or four public lectures that I was required to give as part of my Fulbright grant were mostly about the American “civil rights” movement, in which I was active at the time, although there was also a lecture on the presidency for an audience in Dortmund, in which I cautioned against the exaggerated enthusiasm for Kennedy among others on the moderate Left. Some of these events were quite difficult. It was in Dortmund, however, where my lecture had been translated into German, that I first learned *daß meine deutsche Aussprache durch und durch Sächsisch war*.

Despite the intense demands of my largely internalized *Auseinandersetzung mit Deutschland* during that year, I made headway in my independent studies of Mannheim. The publications originating then had to await an additional summer of research, mostly in London, but one attempted to show structural parallels between Ferguson and Mannheim as two ends of a continuum of intellectuals’ orientations,⁵ while the other was a monograph reporting my findings, unknown at the time except in Hungary, about Mannheim, Lukács, and the so-called Sunday Circle. Lukács’ last generation of students actually gave me to understand that even they learned about these earlier years from my small monograph, written on the basis of nothing but German-language sources, as well as interviews with survivors of the group, since of course I

⁵ "Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Problems in the Formation of Mannheim's Thought," *Political Science Quarterly* LXXXII (September, 1967), pp. 399-426

knew no Hungarian. I remember saying naively to Lukács, whom I visited in 1962 and again in 1963, that it was essential to bring a Hungarian-speaking American researcher to do a proper cultural-historical study of the 1917-1919 years, only to be told that “they” would not permit this, since they already had the histories they wanted. He had little patience himself with my historical questions, but he was kind and he sent me to Zoltán Horváth, who was just completing a well-informed if quite traditional historical survey, which I eventually persuaded Frank Benseler at Luchterhand to publish but which I could not sell to the Ohio State University Press, my only American contact at the time. My own thesis was that both Lukács and Mannheim showed the insufficiency of what I called “revolutionary culturism” and the search for a more adequate political concept, which I thought informed their divergent paths.⁶ I discovered that I had little stomach for the revolutionary option—either in its practical Communist Party form or in its esoteric virtual adaptation in Frankfurt. An indirect testimonial to this conclusion in quite a different idiom was a small article on Montesquieu’s *Persian Letters*, in which I argued, with express reference to Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization*, that Montesquieu had correctly showed that love cannot be a political principle, that politics had to be a more limited project.⁷

My own decade of the 1960s, then, was divided between my largely localized experiments with reformist political activism on behalf of the unsurprising causes of those years, which earned me an unmerited reputation as a “radical,” and a series of essay publications on the relations between such activism and democratic theory, a return to the issues raised in my Neumann review, but now deepened by my first round of studies of Mannheim, as well as the

⁶ *Marxismus und Kultur: Mannheim und Lukács in den ungarischen Revolutionen 1918/19*, Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag (Soziologische Essays), 1967; in Japanese: Pp. 215-281 in *Studies on George Lukács*, Volume 14, Tokyo: Orion Press, 1970; in English (revised): *Telos*, No. 10, Winter 1971, pp. 35-92

⁷ "Montesquieu on Love: Notes on the *Persian Letters*," *American Political Science Review* LVIII (September, 1964), pp. 658-661; reprint in James E. Person, Jr., ed., *Literary Criticism from 1400 to 1800*, 1988; also "The Cheerful Discourses of Michael Oakeshott," *World Politics* XVI (April, 1964), pp. 883-889.

explorations of New Left, notably in its British manifestations. Further enriching my work during those years was a second year in Europe in 1966-67, the unexpected gift of a year as political science Fulbright lecturer at the University of Leiden, supplemented by a semester as instructor in the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague. The respite from activism and the opportunity to observe a Left ranged from dissenting socialists to Provo confirmed me in my habits of distinguishing between the distance required for reflections on radicalism and the mobilizing doctrines associated with direct practice, a main theme of my writings on my return.⁸

In the meantime I returned to Mannheim, obsessively compiling detailed notes on all of his writings and informing myself as well about the Weimar context of his best known work. Yet I was not ready to publish anything. On my return to the United States, I shifted the locus of my activism to the political science profession, about which I thought I knew a good deal from my days as assistant to the editor of the *Review*. My writings and minor political campaigning were focused on reintroducing social theory themes into the discipline, rather than proclaiming a revolutionary revelation. I became chairman of something called the “Caucus for a New Political Science” active in the profession, but I disappointed the more activist recruits to this cause by my insistence on academic standards and a scholarly tone.⁹ While this rather moderate tendency was clear enough to disgust my younger associates, it was little attended by my more senior professional colleagues, not least because the purely political lines of division in the discipline were reinforced by a cleavage between the strongly emplaced advocates of a scientific

⁸ "Political Science and Political Rationality," in David Spitz, ed., Political Theory and Social Change, New York: Atherton Press, 1967; pp. 59-89; "The Politics of Social Change: The Relevance of Democratic Approaches," in William E. Connolly, ed. The Bias of Pluralism, New York: Atherton Press, 1969; pp. 213-249; "Beyond Republicanism: The Socialist Critique of Political Idealism," in Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe, eds., An End to Political Science. The Caucus Papers, New York: Basic Books, 1970; pp. 34-81.

⁹ "The Vocation of Radical Intellectuals," Politics and Society I (Autumn, 1970) and in Ira Katznelson et al., ed., The Politics and Society Reader, New York: David McKay Company, 1974; pp. 333-359; Intellectuellen tussen macht en wetenschap (with Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh), Amsterdam: van Gennep, 1973.

style and the scattered adherents of alternatives accumulated over the decades, as well as new converts to assorted philosophical radicalisms of the time. In 1970, then, I was abruptly removed from this disputed terrain, caught unaware in a transition from my full professorship at Ohio State, which had become unbearable because of the local state of the methodological wars, to a comparable position in a department with a strong political theory core, where I could expect to protect my students from prejudicial requirements. When Ohio State joined other campuses in an outburst of militant protest in the Spring, I invented a kind of peacekeeping role for faculty unwilling to see the dissent simply stifled, but I was nevertheless cast in the role of faculty agitator that was required by the conservative scenarios of those events and found myself virtually unemployable.

After a year of safe haven in a small college, I arrived in a small, welcoming Canadian university, effectively disqualified for active engagements by my alien status and free to return to my more strictly academic quandaries. As was already true in the Ohio State years, my re(thinking) was closely tied to my teaching, all the more because the small-group tutorial format of instruction established at Trent militates against over-assertive one-way communications, even when teaching beginners. This was an important aid to self-reflection as well. After writing an article on the Ohio State events, drawing on Neumann for the first time in some years, to help me think about the legal forms of those conflicts,¹⁰ as well as revising an English version of my Lukács and Mannheim study for a theoretical-political journal, I accepted an assignment to write an article on Herbert Marcuse for a textbook edited by two quite conservative scholars. It would give me a chance to settle accounts, notwithstanding the curious venue and the near

¹⁰ "Law as a Political Weapon," (with Harry R. Blaine) *Politics and Society* I (November, 1971), pp. 479-526

certainty that none of my peers would ever read it. I re-read nearly the entire *oeuvre*, although I eventually had to shorten the piece to cover only writings after the Second World War. In the end, somewhat to my embarrassment, I found little substantive loss when I abandoned the supposed dynamic of the dialectic in favor of a trifurcation into a negation of bourgeois society, a utopian projection, and a theory of political change. In defiance of Marcuse's express strictures, I could extract value only after detotalizing the design to reveal a vigorous and often quite brilliant version of the leftist civic humanism that was the lingua franca of the antifascist exile.¹¹ To complement this article, I published a brief tribute after his death, expounding this humanism at the instance of his "social change" course, for which I had complete notes, as well as an article on the importance of Marcuse's aesthetic theory for the rhetorical design of his critique of bourgeois civilization.¹² I stopped thinking of the Frankfurt School as a vast mountain that I had yet to climb and went for walks instead in the lower-lying woods by incorporating both Adorno and Horkheimer in the cultural studies courses I was beginning to develop and by finding nothing anomalous about distinguishing in their texts between self-dramatizing exaggerations and deep questions. Habermas was a help in all this, although I knew right away that this was not a school that would have me as a regular pupil

The combination of regard and reservation towards Habermas' grand design governed an assignment that led me to a new cycle through my earlier topics. In the spring before a full sabbatical for 1975-76, which I had arranged to spend at Balliol College, Oxford and which I had expected to devote wholly to a book on Karl Mannheim, picking up where I had left off almost ten years earlier and following up a brief programmatic article I had contributed to a collective

¹¹ "Herbert Marcuse. The Critique of Bourgeois Civilization and Its Transcendence," in Anthony de Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue, eds., Contemporary Political Philosophers, New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1975, and London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1976; pp. 1-48

¹² "The Aesthetic Dimension of Herbert Marcuse's Social Theory," Political Theory 10 (May, 1982) pp. 267-275

publication on request,¹³ I was asked to review a book culminating in a treatment of the Scottish moral philosophers of the eighteenth century and following Habermas' lead in interpreting these texts. My ideas of interpretation had been shaken in the meantime not only by practical discoveries in the course of my own experiments but also by the antithetical but equally stimulating ideas of Robert D. Cumming's structural readings and the new Cambridge neo-historicism prefigured by J.G.A. Pocock, whom I had gotten to know in the newly founded American-Canadian organization for the study of political thought. The most important question that arose in the course of the review was precisely about my initial assumption when I first addressed Ferguson, whether his moral philosophy, insofar as it was also a social theory, actually rested on the scheme of historical stages which was doubtless present, but whose actual work in the design had to be discovered rather than imputed on the strength of the later strategies, which it was thought to anticipate.¹⁴ I was able to gain a three-month residency at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities in Edinburgh and to work through Ferguson's archival remains, notably his class lectures. The historical periodization was important to the practical reading of situations appropriate to the actor, I concluded, but not to the spectator's scientific explanation. The relationship between the intellectual and the scholar was one of complementarity, not displacement. In a major article published in 1976, then, and in a less formal sequel a year later, I concluded that I had been right in treating Ferguson's theory as a composite structure but that I had been wrong in relying on a standard paradigm and that I had consequently underestimated the element of constitutional bargaining and political openness in the essayistic theoretical design, as in the political theory itself.¹⁵

¹³ "Political Theory, Ideology, Sociology: The Question of Karl Mannheim," Cultural Hermeneutics 3 (1975), pp. 69-80

¹⁴ "History and Theory in the Scottish Enlightenment," Journal of Modern History, 48 (March, 1976), pp. 95-100

¹⁵ "History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration," Political Theory, 5 (November, 1977), pp. 437-460; "Ferguson's Principles: Constitution in Permanence," Studies in Burke and His Time, 19 (1978), pp. 208-222.

My Mannheim project went more slowly, partly because I found more stimulus to expand my eighteenth-century work, and I did not really gain momentum until a year or two after my return to Canada, when two German-Canadian sociologists already well-known for contributions to Mannheim studies and sociology of knowledge persuaded me to begin a collaboration with them. Most important was Volker Meja, with whom I have collaborated on many things in the past thirty years. He is *übrigens* a product of Frankfurt and the *Institut für Sozialforschung*, at least until his departure for post-graduate study in North America. We edited and in effect translated two booklength manuscripts by Mannheim, for which we also provided interpretive introductions,¹⁶ and we then jointly wrote a brief overall account of Mannheim’s intellectual project, giving due weight to my earlier treatments of his Hungarian beginnings, our new reading of the standard works in the light of the new discoveries, and a non-reductionist treatment of his time in English exile, which I had researched years earlier. Perhaps because the book was so short—and notwithstanding inattentive, somewhat patronizing reviews—there were translations in German, French, Spanish, and Japanese.¹⁷ Our reading of Mannheim emphasized the experimental character of Mannheim’s essays, even when misleadingly presented as chapters in his famous book, *Ideologie und Utopie*, and the centrality of the theme of “politics as a science,” construed as a need to recognize but to render controllable what was historically called the “irrational” element in human social life. Fifteen years later, when Meja and I recast the analysis

¹⁶ Karl Mannheim, *Strukturen des Denkens*, (edited with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr) Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag (STW 298), 1980, 2003; in English as *Structures of Thinking*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, 2001; in Hungarian as *A gondolkodás struktúrái*, Budapest: Atlantisz (Mesteriskola), 1995; Karl Mannheim, *Konservatismus. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens*, (edited with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr) Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag (STW 478), 1984, 2003; in English as *Conservatism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986, 2001; in Italian as *Conservatorismo. Nascita e Sviluppo del Pensiero Conservatore*. Prefazione di Giuseppe Bedeschi. Rome: Biblioteca di Cultura Moderna Laterza, 1989; in Hungarian, 1994.

¹⁷ *Karl Mannheim* (with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr), Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited, and London and New York: Tavistock Publications (Key Sociologists), 1984; in French, transl. by Eddy Treves) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (Sociologie d'Aujourd'hui), 1987; in German, *Politisches Wissen. Studien über Karl Mannheim*, transl. by Reinhard Blomert, Frankfurt: Edition Suhrkamp, 1989; in Spanish, transl. by Francisco González Aramburo, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica (Breviarios), 1990; in Chinese, Taipei: Laureate Book Company, 1997; in Japanese, Tokyo: Ochanomizu 1996.

to incorporate the fistful of specialized Mannheim studies we had published in the interim, we characterized the project as the constitution of an open, multi-dimensional bargaining regime, designed to manage, without resolving, a classic constellation of difficulties confronting liberalism since its first articulation by John Stuart Mill.¹⁸ While the structural analysis of liberalism derived from R.D. Cumming's marvelous (and marvelously eccentric) book—another return to one of my teachers—the account of bargaining regimes drew on quite a different return and overdetermination.

In the autumn of 1979, I became chairman of the Faculty Association at Trent—an office that normally went begging—but I set as a condition for accepting the chore that the established core group would help me to convert the association into a proper trade union, with the capacity of negotiating a binding collective agreement, backed by a right to strike. In this eminently pragmatic and localized form, some of my old political responses revived. The unionization campaign succeeded, and for the next eighteen months, more or less, I spent twelve hours a week

¹⁸ "Politik als Wissenschaft: über Theorie und Praxis bei Karl Mannheim," (with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr) Angewandte Sozialforschung 11 (1983), pp. 403-417; in English, "Is a Science of Politics Possible?" (co-author), Transactions/Society, 24:3 (March/April, 1987), pp. 76-82; in Italian, "La Scienza Politica di Mannheim," MondOperaio 12 (Dicembre, 1987), pp. 76-81; "Karl Mannheim and Conservatism: The Ancestry of Historical Thinking," (with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr) American Sociological Review 49 (February, 1984), pp. 71-85 [excerpts published in Times Higher Education Supplement as "Arguing for Democracy" and in French, "Karl Mannheim et 'Le Conservatisme'", Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie, vol. LXXXIII, 1987, pp. 245-256; published in Italy: Storia della Storiografia 1984, 6, 44-69]; "Settling with Mannheim" (with Volker Meja), State, Culture, and Society, 1:3 (April, 1985); "The Romance of Modernism: Review-essay of George Lukács and His Generation" by Mary Gluck, Canadian Journal of Sociology, Winter, 1986-7, pp. 443-455 "The Reconstitution of Political Life: The Contemporary Relevance of Karl Mannheim's Political Project" (with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr), Polity, 20 (Summer, 1988) 4: 623-647. "Rationalizing the Irrational: Karl Mannheim and the Besetting Sin of German Intellectuals" (with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr), American Journal of Sociology, 95:6 (May 1990) 1441-1473; in Italian: "Razionalizzare l'irrazionale: Karl Mannheim e il vizio inveterato degli intellettuali tedeschi", Rassegna Italiana di Sociologica, 29:4 (ott.-dic. 1988) 487-512; "Karl Mannheim und die Entmutigung der Intelligenz" (with Volker Meja and Nico Stehr) Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 19:2 (April, 1990) 117-130; "That typically German kind of sociology which verges towards philosophy": The Dispute about Ideology and Utopia in the United States." (With Volker Meja) Sociological Theory, 12:3 (November 1994) 279-303; Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism: "The Secret of these New Times." (With Volker Meja). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1995.

at the bargaining table, renegotiating all the rules and procedures governing faculty, up to the actual terms of compensation. Two things gave added weight to the experience. First, a publisher asked me to advise on the question of publishing Franz Neumann's 1934 London School of Economics dissertation on the "Domination of the Rule of Law," which I had never read. And, second, I was unexpectedly invited to spend 1981-2 as a Fellow of the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study in the Social Sciences and Humanities. I actually advised against publishing the Neumann, unless it could be paired with a companion volume on the historical context and meaning of the work, and—of course—I decided to spend the NIAS year on researching Neumann's legal theorizing, beginning with his Weimar years as labor lawyer. This brought me back to school in Frankfurt for the third time, since Neumann's labor law thinking derived from his years with Hugo Sinzheimer, including his service as instructor in the *Akademie der Arbeit*.

The "labor law" founded by Sinzheimer was essentially collective bargaining law, with the prime theoretical puzzle being the legal status of the collective agreement. The central political questions had to do with the relationships between the regimes constituted by relations among state, worker, and employer collective actors and the democratic political constitution, especially insofar as the latter was seen as an agency of social change towards socialism. I concluded from my studies that not even the disastrous outcome of the Weimar experiment disproved the case for a complementarity between quasi-corporatist regimes and the sphere of political action. A defeat is not necessarily a refutation, although it is eminently understandable why the defeated—like Neumann and his associates—should have thought so, at least for a while. With a second year at NIAS, made possible by a sabbatical leave and a grant of visitor's

status from the Institute, I was able to play a part in the belated Dutch reception of Sinzheimer's contribution in exile to the formation of a labor law field in Holland, and to learn from the German discussions of the time about hyper-juridification and deformalization of law, which coincided with a revival of interest in Weimar socialist legal theory.¹⁹ Then too, there was the early work on reflexive law by Gunther Teubner, which derived in turn from American labor law approaches reminiscent of Weimar labor law. The contrast between the mode of legality for which labor law was paradigmatic and the mode of legality grounded in property law led me then to attempt a critique of "new property" approaches to the welfare state and a proposal for a theoretical approach based on the labor law experience.²⁰

All the while, however, I wanted to get a clearer understanding of the differences among bargaining regimes and their various capacities for constituting relationships congruent with reasonable management of conflicts, as well as their capacities for changes in the parties to be recognized and the matters to be deemed proper for negotiation, with special emphasis, of course, on the role of reflexive law in these designs. My studies went in two directions. First,

¹⁹ "The Question of 'Legal Conservatism' in Canada: A Review of Essays in the History of Canadian Law I", Journal of Canadian Studies 18 (Spring, 1983), pp. 136-142; "Works Community and Workers' Organizations: A Central Problem in Weimar Labour Law," Economy and Society 13:3 (August, 1984) 278-303; in Dutch: "'Betriebsgemeinschaft' en Arbeidersorganisatie: Een Kernprobleem in het Arbeidsrecht van de Weimar republiek," Recht en Kritiek 10:4 (December, 1984), 377-396; "Sociological Classics and the Contemporary State of the Law," Canadian Journal of Sociology 9 (1984) pp. 447-458; "A Review of Essays in the History of Canadian Law II," Journal of Canadian Studies 19 (Winter, 1984); "'Sancho Pansa als Statthalter'. Max Weber und das Problem der materiellen Gerechtigkeit" (with Volker Meja), Pp. 713-54 in Heinz Zipprian/Gerhard Wagner, eds., Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Interpretation und Kritik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993; "Legal Formalism and Disillusioned Realism in Max Weber" (with Volker Meja), Polity, 28:3 (Spring, 1996) 307-331. "Hugo Sinzheimer: Advocacy, Law and Social Change." in A.J. Hoekema, ed. Mededelingen 6. Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut voor onderzoek van arbeid en recht. Amsterdam: Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut, 1993. Expanded: Bard Journal of Social Sciences. 2:7-8 (April-May 1994) 12-20.

²⁰ "Law and Constitution in the Welfare State: Impasse or Evolution," Pre-publication as Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 23/84 and in M. David Gelfand, et al., Law in the Welfare State. An Interdisciplinary Perspective, HIMON, Universität-Gesamthochschule Siegen; in German in Rüdiger Voigt, ed., Recht als Instrument der Politik Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986, pp. 88-114; in Dutch: "Recht en staatsbestel in de verzorgingsstaat: impasse of ontwikkeling?" Recht en Kritiek, 11:1 (1985) pp. 55-75; "The Reconstitution of the Welfare State: A Latent Social-Democratic Legacy," Law & Society Review, 21:1 (1987), pp. 9-47.

there was a case study of the role of labor lawyers in the early bargaining regime experiments of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, around the time of the First World War,²¹ a publication that had a sequel some years later in a study of the labor regime sources of the Japanese lifetime employment institution. The latter was initiated by a specialist on Japanese labor relations, who was astonished to find Hugo Sinzheimer and Weimar labor law playing a prominent role in Japanese practice, notwithstanding the formal incorporation of the American design.²² The second direction was initiated by Seymour Martin Lipset's challenge to show whether differences in the labor regime could contribute to explaining the divergences between American and Canadian trade union membership in the years after 1960. This resulted in a series of three publications, done with different combinations of specialist collaborators, including a more practical and a more theoretical comparative treatment of the differences, especially as illuminated by the division between the American and Canadian auto unions.²³ There was a sequel, with a different collaborator, on new developments in the reflexive law of labor relations, with emphasis on the dramatic contrasts between American and Canadian steel regimes, fittingly published in a collection of articles on reflexive labor law issued by the Hugo Sinzheimer Institute of the University of Amsterdam.²⁴ Common to all these studies, which drew on European neo-corporatist experiences as well, was a rejection of the militant conflict models commonplace in North American labor studies, in favor recognizing the versatility and resiliency

²¹ "Interest, Ideology, and Culture: From the Protocols of Peace to *Schlesinger v. Quinto*." Pp. 271-290 in Ian Angus, ed., Anarcho-Modernism. Toward a New Critical Theory. Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2001.

²² "Light from a Dead Sun: The Japanese Lifetime Employment System and Weimar Labor Law," (with Charles T. Tackney), Comparative Labor Law and Policy. 19:101 (1997)

²³ "Is Canada's Experience 'Especially Instructive'?" (With Christopher Huxley and James Struthers), Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Unions in Transition: Entering the Second Century, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1986. pp. 113-132; reprinted as "Trade Unions in North America Since 1945: A Comparison," in Donald Avery and Roger Hall, eds., Coming of Age: Readings in Canadian History Since World War II. Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996. pp. 148-165.; "Unionization and Labour Regimes in Canada and the United States: Considerations for Comparative Research" (with James Struthers and Christopher Huxley), Labour/Le Travail 25 (Spring, 1990), 161-187

²⁴ "American and Canadian Labor Law Regimes and the Reflexive Law Approach" (with Peter Warrian), Pp. 95-137 in Ralf Rogowski and Ton Wilthagen, eds., Reflexive Labour Law. Deventer and Cambridge: Kluwer, 1994.

of bargaining models.

After a rather valedictory review of the marginalization of labor regimes and trade unions by the end of the 1980s,²⁵ I returned fulltime to my third engagement with Mannheim, influenced not only by external developments but also by my 1990 early retirement from my Canadian university and consequent loss of direct contact with Canadian collaborators and conditions. As a result of my labor studies, I felt better equipped to situate Mannheim in the Weimar culture of compromise to which Neumann also belonged before his exile and to understand his modes of negotiation. Triggered by a visiting appointment at the Graduate Center of the City University, and stabilized by a half-time appointment by Leon Botstein, who had sheltered me in 1970, now president of Bard College, the early retirement was also designed to return me to the cultural space of New York. For the first time in over twenty years, I was in regular contact with colleagues in my field and constrained to consider whether the work I'd been doing could be brought into wider professional discussions. On balance, I had to conclude that I remained an occasional visitor. I felt free, accordingly, to pursue my idiosyncratic course. With Volker Meja, as noted, I cleaned up the complex of work on Mannheim, for the last time, as I imagined, adding for the first time some attention to his students as well. This last phase was introduced by a mild but gratifying academic adventure, which had other consequences as well. Around 1985, my attention was called to Nina Rubinstein, who had studied with Mannheim and whose completed dissertation had been pushed aside by the Nazi dismissal of her teacher and by the forced immediate exile of her Menshevik family. A group of us, in America and Frankfurt,

²⁵ "The end of western trade unionism?: social progress after the age of progressivism," (with Volker Meja), Jeffrey C. Alexander and Piotr Sztompka, eds., Rethinking Progress, 123-158. London and New York: Unwin Hyman, 1990. The principal articles cited in notes 19-25 are collected in Domestic Regimes, the Rule of Law, and Democratic Social Change. (Mobility and Norm Change Vol. 3). Berlin and Cambridge MA: Galda & Wilch Glienecke 2001.

eventually persuaded the Johann-Wolfgang-Goether University to allow the faculty to hold a suitable viva voce for the 81-year-old candidate in December 1988 and to award her the earned doctorate, and the dissertation was subsequently published, together with my laudation and some other documents.²⁶ As member of a family that considered itself as exiles from Soviet Russia, Rubinstein wrote what was to have been a comparison between the White Russian and monarchist French emigrations, although the work ultimately concentrated on the epoch of the French Revolution. My encounter with this study suggested a new way of settling my unfinished business with both Mannheim and Neumann, since both cases had already raised questions about the consequences of their forced emigrations and complex subsequent dealings with representatives of their fields in their lands of asylum.²⁷

This shift was delayed, however, by an unexpected new find in 1997 of a major Mannheim text, a verbatim transcript, as it seemed, of his introduction to sociology course in his first Frankfurt semester. Although his own quite detailed lecture notes for other courses had been available in the University of Keele collection, this text comprised a dramatic presentation of his distinctive idea about the forms and purposes of sociology.²⁸ A conference on the new materials brought me together with Colin Loader, the author of a well-respected study of Mannheim, and we decided to publish an English translation of the text, with supporting materials, as well as a book on a theme given new urgency by these documents, Mannheim's

²⁶ „Wie kam es zu Nina Rubinsteins Promotion,“ in Nina Rubinstein, Die französische Emigration nach 1789. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der politischen Emigration. (Dirk Raith, Hg.) Graz: Nausner & Nausner 2000.

²⁷ "Schattenseiten einer erfolgreichen Emigration: Karl Mannheim im englischen Exil", (with Volker Meja) Exilforschung. Ein internationales Jahrbuch, vol. 5 (Fluchtpunkte des Exils), Munich: edition text + kritik, 1987, pp. 170-195.

²⁸ "Can we master the global tensions or must we suffer shipwreck on our own history?" P. 293-308 in Martin Endreß/Ilja Srubar(Hg.): Karl Mannheims Beitrag zur Analyse moderner Gesellschaften, Opladen (Leske + Budrich) 1999.

conception of sociology as the mode of *Bildung* appropriate to the democratic era.²⁹ Questions of education, namely political education, had already played a part in our separate earlier interpretations, but the 1930 record showed the scope of Mannheim's claims for sociology, in view of the historical place of *Bildung* as a major issue of political as well as cultural conflict in Germany. The lectures, moreover, offered new insights into Mannheim's relations with writers he located in the Fascist forefield as well as those he considered orthodox Marxists. Despite the narrow focus on the years between 1930 and 1933, in short, the study with Loader struck me as profoundly instructive not only about Mannheim but also, in view of his character as a representative intellectual, about the state of the question of democracy and culture in those years, so bitterly regretted and so harshly judged by the intellectual exiles of 1933.

Beginning in 2001, then, I turned to an intense if unsystematic study of that phenomenon. Many of the issues had already been raised by my monographic work on Mannheim, Neumann, and Sinzheimer, of course, and the encounter with Nina Rubinstein and her dissertation, as noted, pushed the issue forward, but now I decided to seek the cooperation of colleagues, notably younger scholars, and to see whether my experiences might not give rise to some fresh experiments with these much-studied materials. There have been three stages in this work, marked respectively by a workshop, a large conference, and an email-generated special issue of an interdisciplinary journal. The challenge to the workshop participants, most of whom I did not

²⁹ Karl Mannheim, *Sociology as Political Education*. (Edited and translated, with Colin Loader). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2001; *Karl Mannheim's Sociology as Political Education*. (With Colin Loader). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2002. "Political Education for a Polity of Dissensus: Karl Mannheim and the Legacy of Max Weber." *European Journal of Political Theory*, vol. I, no. 1 (2002), pp. 31-51; "Temporizing with Time Wars: Karl Mannheim and Problems of Historical Time," (with Colin Loader), *Time and Society*, 13 (2004) 2/3, 155-172; "The Secrets of Mannheim's Success," Eberhard Demm, Hrsg. *Soziologie, Politik und Kultur. Von Alfred Weber zur Frankfurter Schule*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003. Pp. 141-153. Translated, Revised and Expanded: „Das Geheimnis des bemerkenswerten Aufstiegs Karl Mannheims" in Bálint Balla, Vera Sparschuh, Anton Sterbling, eds., *Karl Mannheim. Leben, Werk, Wirkung, und Bedeutung für die Osteuropaforschung*. Hamburg: Krämer, 2007. 149-168.

know, was epitomized in the title, “No Happy End,” inspired by the deep disappointment and self-blame evident in the late writings of Mannheim and Neumann, notwithstanding their status as models of émigré success. Out of the workshop arose a less one-sided problematique, namely “contested legacies,” which referred to three distinct sites of contestation: the Weimar scene, the diverse bargaining regimes among the exiles themselves and in their relations with their respective fields in the places of asylum, and in the successive waves of reception.³⁰ The ancestry of this kind of contextualization in my confrontations with Mannheim’s approaches is evident, but my own actual contributions to the project had mostly to do with Neumann, although the momentum also led me to publish some narrowly focused studies of Nina Rubinstein, Hans Mayer and Erich Kahler.³¹ The principal result of the effort was reported in an introduction to the main collective publication arising out of the project, written with the Germanist, Gerhard Lauer. Taking up the insight developed in the book on Mannheim and “political education,” we contrasted the way in which the dispute between *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* was structured during the Weimar years with the contest in American higher education between proponents of “liberal arts” and “professionalism,” with a view to posing questions about the exiles’ various negotiations of the translation and transition, with special emphasis of course on the documentation of these efforts in their substantive work.³²

³⁰ Contested Legacies: The German-Speaking Intellectual and Cultural Emigration to the US and UK, 1933-1945. (Edited) Berlin and Cambridge MA: Galda & Wilch, 2002.

³¹ "Self-Knowledge and Sociology: Nina Rubinstein's Studies in Exile." Edward Timms and Jon Hughes, eds., Intellectual Migration and Cultural Transformation. Wien/New York: Springer, 2003. Pp. 195-206; “The Symbolic Uses of Exile: Erich Kahler at Ohio State University” Pp. 269-310 in Alexander Stephan, ed., *Exile and Otherness.* Oxford, Bern: Peter Lang 2005; “A German Subject to Recall: Hans Mayer as Internationalist, Cosmopolitan, Outsider and/or Exile,” *New German Critique* 96 (June, 2006).

³² “The ‘Other Germany’ and the Question of *Bildung*,” (with Gerhard Lauer) in Kettler and Lauer, eds., *Exile, Science, and Bildung: The Contested Legacies of German Emigre Intellectuals* (New York and London: Palgrave, 2005); Contested Legacies: Political Theory and the Hitler Regime. Special Issue of the European Journal of Political Theory. Edited (with Thomas Wheatland). June 2004; “‘Weimar and Labor’ as Legacy: Ernst Fraenkel, Otto Kahn-Freund, and Franz L. Neumann”, Helga Schreckenberger, ed., *Die Alchemie des Exils. Exil als schöpferischer Impuls.*(Vienna: Edition Praesens 2005)

The “Contested Legacies” project led me to three questions, which I have only begun to address. The first of these, corresponding to the third “phase” mentioned above, is documented in a collection called “Limits of Exile,” which brings together studies of numerous intellectual emigrations, ranging from Iraqi Jewish novelists in Israel and Irani students in the United States to Spanish Civil War exiles in Mexico and Russian philosophers in Weimar Germany.³³ The unifying question had to do with the post-modern and post-colonial versions of the long-established metaphorical extension of the exile concept to comprehend states of estrangement that had no specific political source or character, a complex of issues I was constrained to address by the assorted conferences to which I brought the papers spun off the original projects. My proposal was to limit the concept of exile to its less metaphorical dimensions, lest we impoverish our abilities to examine the limits imposed by the condition—and even blur the inquiry into changes that may indeed render exile in the politically charged sense an anachronism.³⁴ The contributors to the collection, including my co-editor, were not all agreed, and the project remains open. The second new question deriving from my renewed attention to Neumann as a representative social science émigré had to do with the interplay between the emigrants and the academic disciplines in which some of them found a home. Specifically, I made some presentations to political scientists—my first return to professional meetings in over twenty years—and wrote two studies, drawing on archival records as well as my own recollections of my work on the *American Political Science Review* with the focus on the unexpected upsurge in the mid 1950s of “political theory” in modes inconsistent with accepted science models, at a time when quite simple positivist models of social science were so strongly

³³ The Limits of Exile. Special Issue of the Journal of the Interdisciplinary Crossroads. Edited (with Zv Ben-Dor). April 2006.

³⁴ “Les émigrés sont les vaincus.’ Spiritual Diaspora and Political Exile.” *Journal of Interdisciplinary Crossroads* I, 3 (2004)

in the ascendant.³⁵ It was important, I thought, to organize this inquiry, precisely because it cut so close to the autobiographical bone, in a way that I could test by presentations to colleagues oriented to the discipline. I thought I had to negotiate its recognition on an agenda less restrictive than my own stock-taking.

In this spirit, Volker Meja and I are returning one last time to Mannheim, in order to focus on the less self-reflexive dimension of his project, the side he presented to disciplinary professionals inspired by Max Weber, especially through an examination of the projects Mannheim set his doctoral students during his lamentably brief but extraordinarily fruitful three years in Frankfurt, a time in which he managed nevertheless to fill the place of Oppenheimer's "Frankfurt School," in its competition with the "Kölner Schule" of von Wiese. This book, to be offered to the present generation of scholars who are looking at Mannheim anew, notably in Frankfurt, will bring together some past publications of ours on several of his women students, as well recently published papers on Kaethe Truhel, who wrote on social workers and bureaucrats in the Weimar welfare state, and on Jacob Katz, who wrote on the ideology of Jewish assimilation.³⁶ The last of these papers, written with Volker Meja during a joint month at Dan Diner's Jewish Studies institute in Leipzig, resonates with a friendship earlier dramatized on a day in Poland, twenty years earlier, when we first visited the village where Volker, born in 1940, had spent some war years with his grandmother until they were forced on the road by the

³⁵ "Political Science and Political Theory: The Heart of the Matter," in Brian Caterino and Sanford Schram, eds., *Making Political Science Matter: the Flyvbjerg Debate and Beyond*. New York: NYU Press, 2006; "The Political Theory Question in Political Science, 1956-1967," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 100, No. 4 (November 2006)

³⁶ "Their own 'peculiar way': Karl Mannheim and the Rise of Women." (With Volker Meja), *International Sociology* 8:1 (March, 1993) 5-55; "Women and the State: Käthe Truhel and the Idea of a Social Bureaucracy," *History of the Human Sciences*, vol. 20, No. 1 (2007) 19-44; "Karl Mannheim's Jewish Question. History, Sociology, and the Epistemics of Reflexivity," (with Volker Meja) in: *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook* 3 (2004), 325-347.

approach of Russian armies, and when we then drove on to Auschwitz, just before dusk, where I lost beloved aunts and uncles and cousins of my age, and where I would have died myself, if it had not been for an unlikely combination of lucky accidents.

The Leipzig paper on Mannheim was called “Mannheim’s Jewish Question,” and it attempted to answer, with the help of his dealings with Katz, why Mannheim never once addressed the inhuman happenings later comprehended as the “Holocaust,” although he never denied his Jewish parents, who both survived the years of the Budapest ghetto, in his personal life. Our thesis, uncertain and speculative, was that Mannheim’s “intellectual,” if he was Jewish, had strong reasons, unrelated to clichés about self-hatred, to impose a silence about Jewishness, in order to reproduce a setting free of Christian-ness upon which the constitution of the *Bildungsschicht* depended—a counter-part, perhaps, of Adam Ferguson’s never explained decision to surrender his standing and title as a clergyman when he returned to the Edinburgh of David Hume and Adam Smith.

That half-serious allusion underlines the obvious reflexive implications of the thesis of the Katz paper for my attempt to make sense of my own intellectual course. After all, questions about Jewishness and Holocaust are absent from my own record as well. Yet the argument about intellectuals is too vague. Much more to the point, I think, is the generational identification I introduced at the outset. Antifascism was a reading of the short twentieth century that precluded anything like the centering of antisemitism, not to speak of Holocaust. Until constrained to adapt by events at the bargaining table, Franz Neumann opposed the turn towards anti-semitism in the studies of Horkheimer’s Institute in New York, claiming that he had exposed National Socialism

in his *Behemoth* virtually without a serious reference to the phenomenon. My present projects, accordingly, include an attempt to understand the vicissitudes of antifascism, in its transformations in the course of exile and return. My contribution to “Limits of Exile” deals with return from concentration camp as a mode of exile and return³⁷, and all the attention I can spare from the Mannheim project is going to a larger, comparative study, including especially all the phenomena that my lateborn arrival in the antifascist exile generation spared me from having to face, notably the terrors of Stalinism. Where this will almost certainly not end is in some pathetic proclamation of Jewish identity. I am not about to kick over the negotiating table. And perhaps, given the realities registered on tables of another sort—actuarial tables--it will not end at all, because it will simply have to stop. The bell will ring, and school will be out.

³⁷ “Exile and Return: Forever Winter,” *Journal of the Interdisciplinary Crossroads*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (April 2006) 181-200.